Prelude to War: No Rotation Policy Limits Choices

        As the defensive force buildup continued, each service developed plans to sustain its forward deployments.Units were identified to replace the forces first sent to Southwest Asia in case there was a long deployment.

        The Pentagon does not have a standard rotation policy, so a debate on this issue began in earnest. Two issues fueled discussion -- concern for soldiers' welfare in a harsh environment and the realization that a rotation policy could drive larger decisions on the deployment. Questions arose about how long troops could remain in Saudi Arabia without either fighting or leaving.If U.S. forces were to remain in the theater through the spring and summer of 1991, a rotation policy would have been necessary because of the impacts on morale and the ability to sustain readiness levels.

        On the other hand, early commitment to a rotation policy could have foreclosed an early military option. Beginning to move troops in and out of the theater would create turbulence and distract warplanning.

        Notwithstanding Administration statements that no decision had been made, the President's November 8 announcement to send more troops to Saudi Arabia amounted to a choice on rotation. The additional deployment severely constrained DOD's ability to implement a rotation policy over an extended period.

        When Congress authorized the President to use military force in January 1991, the question of rotation became moot.

AIR POWER: THE MOST SIGNIFICANT FACTOR IN WINNING WAR

        The war began with simultaneous air strikes against all elements of the Iraqi military and its support structure. Bombing then continued around-the-clock every day. The mass and precision of the attack induced systemic shock and paralysis from which the political and military leadership never recovered.

        The early attainment of air supremacy enabled allied forces to isolate the battlefield by interdicting enemy supply lines and degrading command and control links. Air supremacy also allowed coalition forces to conduct cross-border reconnaissance and aggressive deception and harassment operations with virtual impunity.

        The air campaign blinded the Iraqi military and eliminated its ability to detect movement or massing of coalition forces. This allowed ground force commanders to cloak the massive movement of over two corps of troops, equipment and supplies to setup the " Left Hook " maneuver that proved so successful. The " Left Hook " was a massive movement of ground forces westward to avoid Iraqi defenses.

        Finally, the air campaign drastically wore down the ability and the will of the Iraqi army to fight. Iraqi ground forces were so devastated and demoralized by the time the ground war started that they lacked the conviction to fight for their own soil, much less Kuwait. One senior Army division commander said, " The Iraqi soldier's lack of will to fight was due very much to the [ air campaign's ] preparation of the battlefield. When we got

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