on his flanks and his rear, he surrendered. The defeat of the Iraqi Army was the result of the synergism between our air and ground forces ".

Air Power as an Instrument of War

         During the planning stage of Operation Desert Storm, air power advocates hoped that a concentrated strategic air campaign against Saddam's political, economic and military centers would force Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait and eliminate the threat to the region posed by the Baath regime without resorting to ground warfare. These were hoped - for results, never official objectives, and they were not achieved. The air campaign did not force Saddam to withdraw and despite its military effectiveness, did not lead to his overthrow. Consequently, valid questions remain about the limits of air power to achieve largely political goals.

         However, the use of increasingly precise air power permitted the pursuit of specific military objectives such as disabling targets rather than destroying them while seeking to minimize damage to Iraqi society. Whether the attempt to limit the war's impact on civilians was successful remains in question, awaiting a more careful analysis.

The Air Tasking Order

         In contrast to Vietnam, where as many as four independent air chains of command operated autonomously, General Schwarzkopf established a highly effective joint chain of command for air operations. This design pooled all fixed - wing aircraft in the theater under the control of the Joint Forces Air Component Commander ( JFACC ), General Charles Homer. Using computer capabilities not available in previous major conflicts, the JFACC could match the most appropriate weapons in the pool with the targets. The result of the daily matching process was the Air Tasking Order ( ATO ).

         The ATO created a carefully integrated campaign, choreographing thousands of daily air sorties into Iraq and the Kuwaiti theater of operations from multiple points in the Arabian peninsula, Spain, England, Turkey and elsewhere all without a single midair collision or accidental shoot - down of friendly aircraft.

         Despite its success, the process had its detractors. The most frequent complaints faulted the JFACC staff, an Air Force dominated organization, for forcing " Air Force approaches " on the other services.

         Another complaint found the ATO guilty of hindering services' ability to cope with real - time battlefield developments. The story of two brothers, one a Navy pilot and the other an Air Force pilot, provides an illustration. During the air campaign, the Persian Gulf Carrier Task Force came across intelligence that revealed several MIGs parked at an Iraqi airfield. This information was passed repeatedly to Riyadh by the Navy with an urgent request for a tasking in the ATO to attack the target. The next few ATOs arrived without the tasking. The carrier air wing commanders once again contacted Riyadh to say, " Hey guys, this is a great juicy target. Let us take it out ". Again the ATO arrived without the tasking. Eventually, the Navy pilot called his brother, the Air Force pilot, at Al Kharj Air Base through the commercial satellite hook - up and told him about the target. The next day, the Navy pilot received a message from his brother that said, " Mission accomplished. Thanks for the DFC! " ( Distinguished Flying Cross ).

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